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Does Parental Involvement Improve Learning? 




This study examines conditional correlations between different types of parental involvement, 
namely, support of education at home and formal participation at school, and children’s test 
performance. We use survey data and standardized tests conducted in 126 primary schools in 
Kwanza-Sul, Angola. We report positive and significant correlations for involvement at home, 
and negative and significant correlations for formal involvement, although coefficients are 
larger and stronger for the former. In addition, we find that the relationship between formal 
participation and test performance is shaped by school quality, as negative correlations found 
in benchmark specifications are exclusive to involvement in lower-performing schools. 
 




* I sincerely thank my supervisor, Pedro Vicente, for the continuous guidance and support in the elaboration of 
this work project, and for introducing me to the world of development economics throughout the Masters. I further 
thank Stefan Leeffers for providing ideas and comments, helping me navigate the dataset and, above all else, for 
the data collection and treatment which made this dissertation possible. I thank all other colleagues and individuals 
involved in fieldwork. I thank José Gabriel and NOVAFRICA colleagues for providing comments and suggestions. 
Finally, a special thank you to my parents, friends, and Guilherme Oliveira, for keeping me good humored during 




Access to education has expanded significantly in developing countries, mirroring priority-
areas acted upon by governments and development partners in the past couple of decades.  
However, schooling differs from learning, and progress in the quality and delivery of education 
has been slower. In Tanzania and Uganda, more than 25% of students enrolled in the fifth grade 
are unable to recognize simple written words (Jones et al., 2014).1 In Angola, a recent 
comprehensive survey finds that 40% of children aged 8 to 11 are attending a grade that is at 
least two years behind the correct grade for their age, either due to late enrolment or grade 
repetition.2  
Researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners have long recognized the central role of 
parents in shaping children’s educational progress. Parents can take ownership of the learning 
process in a variety of ways, as engagement can start in the household and extend to schools 
and communities. However, in developing countries, particularly in deprived rural settings, 
parents might lack the capacity, resources, or incentives to support their children’s education. 
In Angola, poverty is rampant, and the adult literacy rate is currently at 65.6%, decreasing to 
41% in rural areas.3 Poor uneducated parents face many competing demands that drain their 
time and resources, and without recognizing the immediate value in supporting their children’s 
education, this endeavour might be understood as less important than work, home production, 
or leisure. Thus, policy options for today’s uneducated children, living with today’s uneducated 
parents, are not straightforward (Banerji, Berry, and Shotland, 2017). 
A growing subset of the literature in education and development economics explores 
whether and how parents can improve learning. There is limited evidence of educational gains 
 
1 2012 Uwezo Initiative data. The Uwezo Initiative monitors basic literacy and numeracy levels of primary and 
secondary-school-aged children across at least half of the districts in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda through 
comprehensive household surveys. 
2 UNICEF and INE, “Childhood in Angola: A Multidimensional Analysis of Child Poverty”, 2018. 
3 INE, Definitive results on the 2014 Census. 
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from good parenting practices when it comes to deprived settings, given all of parents’ 
constraints (i.e.: Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2012; Banerji, Berry, and Shotland, 2017). On the 
other hand, in recent decades there has been widespread enthusiasm for programmes that aim 
to improve learning by formally including parents in schools’ decision-making processes. 
Nevertheless, as programmes vary significantly in design, degree of parental involvement, and 
context, the literature presents mixed results (see Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009, or Glewwe, 
Galiani, and Perez-Truglia, 2015, for a review). 
Our work contributes to this topic by examining conditional correlations between different 
types of parental involvement and children’s learning, as measured by standardized testing. We 
mainly consider parental support of education at home and formal participation at school. We 
take a non-experimental approach and use micro-level data collected in the province of 
Kwanza-Sul, one of the poorest in Angola, where approximately 63% of primary-school-aged 
children are educationally deprived.2 We start by running benchmark OLS regressions using 
involvement indices as our main regressor of interest. Moreover, we conduct a heterogeneous 
analysis to assess whether other educational inputs shape the relationship between parental 
involvement and children’s learning. We do this for parental education and school quality, as 
proxied by the school’s relative performance in standardized tests. Lastly, to address 
endogeneity in the parental involvement decision we attempt an Instrumental Variable 
approach, although we suffer from low first-stage explanatory power.  
We find that, on average, involvement at home is positively and significantly correlated 
with test performance, whereas formal involvement is negatively and significantly correlated 
with test results in our sample. The first relationship is larger in magnitude and significance. 
We report no consistent evidence for heterogeneous effects in terms of parental education. 
However, we find that the relationship between formal participation and test results is strongly 
shaped by school performance, as the average negative correlation found in benchmark 
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specifications is exclusive to participation in lower-performing schools. We hypothesize that 
parents might find it difficult to identify priorities, or unintendedly contribute to the dispersion 
of attention and resources, in schools with many pressing necessities. In addition, parents might 
be more constrained to effectively hold teachers and directors accountable in lower-quality 
schools. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that negative estimates for formal 
participation are explained by selection bias, as parents of students with poor academic track 
records, or low ability, might be more motivated to be formally involved. Negative self-
selection would also apply at the school level and could be disproportionately present in lower-
performing schools, hence possibly explaining our heterogeneous findings as well. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we conduct a literature 
review. In Section 3, we briefly present the Angolan context. In Section 4, we discuss data and 
measurement. In Section 5, we present our empirical strategy. In Section 6, we report and 
analyse results. In Section 7, we discuss one of our main limitations. Finally, in Section 8, we 
present concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review 
Literature in education and economics has long recognized the central role of parents in 
shaping their children’s educational progress. Some research in economics attempts to quantify 
the importance of parental inputs in the formation of children’s cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills through structural models (Todd and Wolpin, 2007; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha, 
Heckman, and Schennach, 2010). Following the “experimental revolution”, a growing 
literature sheds light on the “black box” of parental inputs in the education production function, 
aiming to understand how sensible policies can increase parents’ commitment to action when 
it comes to their children’s education, and quantify gains in learning. Our work relates to several 
strands of this literature, one focusing on parental support of education at home, another on 
parents’ individual participation and collective action in schools.  
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When it comes to developing countries, with lower levels of adult literacy, there is limited 
evidence on how parents can support education outside schools, and how much their children 
will benefit (i.e.: Kagitcibasi, Sunar, and Bekman, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2010; Andrabi, Das, 
and Khwaja, 2012; Banerji, Berry, and Shotland, 2017; Di Maro et al., 2020). In rural India, 
Banerjee et al. (2010) find that when volunteers are trained to hold after-school remedial 
reading camps, parents and community members mobilize to teach, resulting in significant 
improvements in children’s reading skills. In the same context, Banerji, Berry, and Shotland 
(2017) evaluate a programme where mothers receive daily literacy classes, training and 
materials to increase involvement in their children’s education at home, or both, finding that all 
treatments improve maternal literacy and education support, generating positive spillovers in 
children’s test scores. In Angola, Di Maro et al. (2020) provide evidence that supplying parents 
with information on the performance of local schools, relative to others in the province, and on 
good parenting practices, significantly improves parental involvement in education at home, 
although this does not translate into improved learning, as measured by standardized testing.  
In addition, our work relates to the growing literature on formal parental participation. In 
recent decades, several developing countries have implemented School-Based Management 
(SBM) policies aimed at empowering local stakeholders, often focusing on parents, to actively 
engage in school decision-making via some type of Committee. These policies aim at increasing 
the authority and accountability of local participants over school performance, and ultimately 
learning (see Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009, or Glewwe, Galiani, and Perez-Truglia, 2015, for a 
review). Given the endless design possibilities of participatory programmes, and the importance 
of local context, the literature presents mixed results.  
Some programmes lead to improvements in learning (i.e.: Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-
Codina, 2012; Barr et al., 2012; Pradhan et al., 2014; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2015; Andrabi, 
Das, and Khwaja, 2017). In Kenya, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2015) find that when parents in 
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School Councils are given funds to hire short-term supplementary teachers, and trained to 
monitor them, school governance and standardized test scores improve in their sample. Pradhan 
et al. (2014) provide evidence that when parents are democratically elected to School 
Committees, and establish linkages with local governing authorities in Indonesia, this increases 
parental involvement and contributions to schools, leading to improved student performance. 
Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) find that providing parents with report cards on the relative 
performance of local schools, and their children, results in parents taking students out of lower-
performing schools, improving average test scores for their sample of Pakistani children. 
Similarly, in Uganda, Barr et al. (2012) find that when School Committees determine objectives 
and progress indicators to be included on performance report cards disclosed to parents, student 
and teacher absenteeism decrease, and student performance improves.  
Contrary to this, another strand of the literature reports null or heterogeneous impacts on 
learning (i.e.: Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2005; Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky, 2008; 
Banerjee et al., 2010; Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann, 2013; Blimpo, Evans, and Lahire, 
2015; Beasley and Huillery, 2017; Di Maro et al., 2020). Blimpo, Evans, and Lahire (2015) 
find that the effect of an SBM reform in the Gambia, consisting of grants and large-scale 
capacity building of School Committees, is strongly shaped by parental human capital. In 
villages where adult literacy rates were greater than 45%, the policy improved test scores, but 
in villages where literacy was sufficiently lower, test results decreased. Beasley and Huillery 
(2017) evaluate a similar grant and training programme in Niger, finding that, surprisingly, 
Committees where a majority of parents are educated focus grant disbursement on lumpy 
infrastructure investments, in detriment of more beneficial spending, such as pupil educational 
support, preferred by Committees composed mainly by uneducated parents. Thus, grants and 
training of parents negatively impacted test scores in the first group and had null effects in the 
second. In Argentina, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2005) find that the effect of early-90s school 
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decentralization policies is mediated by local governmental capacity, proxied by provincial 
fiscal deficits: whilst in low-deficit areas, decentralization increased test scores, in high-deficit 
areas, test scores decreased. Evaluating the same policies, Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 
(2008) conclude that “decentralization helped the good get better, but left the poor behind”, as 
school autonomy increased student performance in wealthier communities, but had null effects 
in poor communities. 
Our work contributes particularly to the literature on heterogeneity, both when it comes to 
parental engagement at home and via formal channels, as we test whether parental education 
and school quality are important mediators of the conditional correlations between parents’ 
involvement and children’s learning. This is particularly relevant in the Angolan context, as 
low adult literacy and education levels, along with lower school quality, may hinder parents’ 
well-intentioned attempts to engage in children’s education.  
3. Country context: Angola 
Angola, a country on the west coast of Southern Africa, with 30.8 million inhabitants and a 
GDP per capita, in PPP, of 6452 international USD,4 is, unfortunately, an often-cited example 
of the resource curse, as despite large revenues from oil and other extractive industries, the 
general environment of weak and notoriously corrupt institutions5 has hindered sustained 
improvements in priority development areas. Thus, almost two decades following the end of a 
devastating civil war, the country struggles with an agonizing 51% multidimensional poverty 
rate,6 and poor quality of health and education services, ranking 149th out of 189 countries in 
the 2019 Human Development Index.  
 
4 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2018. 
5 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2019 ranks Angola as the 37th most corrupt out of 183 
countries. 
6 UNDP, Human Development Index, 2019. 
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When it comes to its education system, children in Angola should start pre-school at age 5 
and complete mandatory primary schooling between ages 6 to 11. However, universal access 
to primary education is still not guaranteed, as the adjusted net enrolment rate in the first grade 
of primary schooling was 65.16% in 2016.7 Furthermore, a recent representative survey finds 
that only 44% of children aged 12-17 have completed primary school.2 Finally, parents in 
Angola might lack the capacity to support their children’s education, as the adult literacy rate 
currently stands at 65.6%, decreasing to 41% in rural areas.3  
Our work uses data from a sample of schools in Kwanza-Sul, the fifth most populated 
province and one of the poorest amongst all 18 provinces. The demographic structure in 
Kwanza-Sul is very young, with approximately 50% of its 1.8 million inhabitants being children 
aged 0-14.8 When it comes to education, the province faces several problems, including an adult 
literacy rate of 55%, below the national average, and a worryingly low primary-school 
attendance rate of 27%, as per UNICEF.2  In addition, school inputs are likely lacking, as despite 
being the fifth most populous province, with young children accounting for half of its 
demographic breakdown, Kwanza-Sul ranks eight in terms of primary school and teachers 
endowment, and seventh in terms of primary-school classrooms.9 
4. Data and Measurement 
4.1. Data Source  
We use endline data collected in a field experiment on community-driven monitoring, 
implemented in 126 primary schools, across nine municipalities, in the province of Kwanza-
Sul (Di Maro et al., 2020). This randomized control trial (RCT) was implemented by Fundo de 
Apoio Social, a governmental institution, and the endline data collection took place between 
 
7 UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2016 data. 
8 INE, Definitive results on the 2014 Census for the Kwanza-Sul Province. 
9 INE, Social Statistics 2011-2016. Most recent available data. As of 2013, Kwanza-Sul had 477 primary schools 
and 6171 primary teachers. As of 2016, the province had 4423 classrooms in all its primary schools.  
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July-December 2018. Schools were randomly allocated across four comparable groups, namely, 
a control and three treatment groups. The first treatment consisted of household visits in which 
parents received information on the performance of local schools, relative to others in the 
province, and on parenting practices beneficial to education. In the second treatment, parents 
were invited to gather in meetings, where school problems and action-plans to overcome them 
were discussed. The third treatment combined the first two. 
At endline, standardized tests were applied for students of the 3rd, 4th and 5th grades, in the 
disciplines of Mathematics and Portuguese language. Tests were conducted during student’s 
regular classes and were scored on a scale of 0-10 by the evaluating team. Additionally, the 
parents of 40 randomly selected students per school were invited for interviews. A total of 1977 
parents came to school and answered the questionnaires. One limitation of our dataset is that 
we cannot match students, or parents, at baseline and endline. Thus, we use individual test 
scores for students whose parents were interviewed at endline as our main outcome of interest. 
We conduct our analysis using test scores on both Maths and Portuguese, and across all 
grades.10 However, as some of the randomly selected students were absent from school when 
tests took place, we have 3086 tests with matched parents, less than two tests per student. It also 
occurred that some classes took only one test, between Maths and Portuguese. 
From the parent surveys, we use self-reported measures of individual engagement with their 
children’s education. Our main indicators are of involvement at home and within formal 
channels at the school level. We also consider supplemental measures such as parent-teacher 
engagement and parent-community engagement. Other relevant variables from the parent’s 
surveys are socio-economic controls (i.e.: marital status; number of dependent children; 
 
10 We perform separate analysis for Maths and Portuguese tests, but the reduction in sample size impacts estimation 
power. Thus, we only show estimations that include both test types, mentioning results across disciplines when 
deemed relevant.   
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educational attainment; selected student’s age and gender).11 Finally, we use school 
administrative data from 2018 to create a set of basic school controls (i.e.: number of teachers; 
number of classrooms; access to water and electricity).  
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
The average standardized test score for Maths and Portuguese across all grades, for students 
whose parents were interviewed at endline, is 5.63 points (on a scale of 1-10), with the average 
score not differing significantly across disciplines (Table 1). Tested students are 11 years old, 
on average, and evenly split across genders. Most respondents are the actual parents of selected 
students, but 21% of the parent surveys were taken by other family members, such as brothers, 
aunts, and grandparents. Surveyed parents are, on average, 40 years old, and 49% female. The 
majority reports having a partner and, on average, 6 dependent children. 59% of sampled 
parents have completed primary school or acquired further education.  
Schools in our sample have, on average, 20 teachers and 716 students, which yields a pupil-
to-teacher ratio of approximately 36. Whilst 86% of schools have at least one toilet, basic 
infrastructure is far from assured, as only 26% of schools have access to water and only 38% 
have electricity. The average number of classrooms is 7, which given the average number of 
students, might mean crowded classrooms or lessons taken outside due to lack of infrastructure. 
When it comes to measures of involvement at home, parents report often keeping clear rules 
and a regular sleep schedule for their children, but, on average, have only helped them with 
homework 3 times in the past two weeks. Family meals have occurred 5 times in 14 past days. 
Regarding formal participation, 17% of parents are elected-members of Parent Committees, 
and our sample reports having attended general school meetings once per semester, in the past 
 
11 Teachers, directors, and other school board members were also interviewed at endline. We do not use school-
reported measures of formal involvement because most measures analogous to those reported by parents are 
aggregated at the school level, so they would not be fit to estimate a relationship between each parent’s 
involvement and their child’s performance on standardized tests. Similarly, comparable measures of parent-teacher 
engagement reported by teachers are mostly at the class-level.  
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school year. Only 5% of parents have placed a suggestion or complaint regarding the education 
services of the municipality within the past two years. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
   N Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Students      
Age 1973 11.299 2.078 5 19 
Female 1977 .493 .5 0 1 
Test Score 3086 5.628 2.754 0 10 
Test Score PT  1553 5.626 2.872 0 10 
Test Score MAT 1533 5.631 2.63 0 10 
Parents      
Respondent is student parent 1976 .79 .407 0 1 
Age 1969 39.865 11.261 18 83 
Female 1977 .489 .5 0 1 
Has partner 1975 .563 .496 0 1 
No. dependent children 1977 6.159 3.13 1 35 
Completed Primary school 1976 .59 .492 0 1 
Parental involvement at Home 1      
Freq. keeping clear rules at home 1944 2.779 .924 0 4 
Freq. keeping regular sleep schedule   1949 2.719 1.029 0 4 
No. times helping with homework 1813 3.388 3.756 0 14 
No. times having family meals 1860 5.363 5.237 0 14 
Formal parental involvement 1      
Parent is member of Parent Committee 1230 .172 .378 0 1 
Freq. attending General School meetings 1914 2.472 1.733 0 7 
Placed education suggestions/complaints  1976 .054 .226 0 1 
School      
Total no. Students 123 715.886 544.753 43 2782 
Total no. Teachers 123 20.415 34.526 0 236 
Total no. Classrooms 123 6.789 6.639 0 53 
Has at least one Bathroom 126 .857 .351 0 1 
Has access to Water 123 .26 .441 0 1 
Has Electricity 123 .39 .49 0 1 
Note: 1 A comprehensive listing of survey questions used in involvement indices is included in the annex (Table A4).  
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy employed to estimate conditional 
correlations between parental involvement and standardized test scores. Our benchmark OLS 
specification is as follows: 
 𝑌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛿𝑆𝑗𝑘 + 𝜂𝑀𝑘 + 𝜃𝑇𝑠 + 𝑖𝑗𝑘            (1) 
where Ysijk is our outcome of interest, the standardized test score s for student i in school j and 
municipality k; PIijk is an index of parental involvement for parent i in school j and municipality 
k; Xijk is a vector of parent and student demographic controls; Sjk is a vector of school controls; 
Mk is a vector of eight municipality dummies, and Ts is a vector of dummies for the standardized 
12 
 
test discipline and grade. Residuals are robust and clustered at the school level, the level of 
randomization in the field experiment. Additional specifications include school fixed effects, 
comparing students within the same school, or class fixed effects, comparing students of the 
same cohort, as in Avvisati et al. (2014). 
Our coefficient of interest is β1, which estimates the conditional correlation between each 
parent’s involvement and their child’s standardized test performance. We expect this 
relationship to be positive, yet as we consider different types of involvement, the magnitude 
and significance of the coefficient will vary. Since parent surveys provide several measures for 
the same type of involvement, we build one aggregated index per involvement type, as in 
Beasley and Huillery (2017) and Di Maro et al. (2020). This aggregation increases statistical 
power to detect correlations that go in the same direction within a domain and ensures that β1 
coefficients are comparable for different types of involvement.  
Our main analysis includes two indices. In the Involvement at Home Index, we consider 
three survey measures: the frequency of keeping clear rules, the frequency of keeping a regular 
sleep schedule for the child, how many times parents helped with homework, and the number 
of family meals in the past two weeks. We orient scales such that higher scores mean higher 
involvement and take z-scores of each variable. The aggregate Involvement at Home Index is 
an equally-weighted average of the z-scores of its components. In the Formal Involvement 
Index, we aggregate three survey measures: whether the parent is a member of the Parents 
Committee, the frequency of attending general school meetings in the past school-year, and 
whether the parent has placed a suggestion or complaint related to the municipality education 
services in the past two years. We also consider two supplementary indices, namely Parent-
Teacher Engagement and Parent-Community Engagement. 12 
 





6.1. Benchmark OLS  
 In this section, we report and analyse benchmark OLS estimates for the conditional 
correlations between parental involvement and children’s standardized test performance. Table 
2 reports estimates as specified in section 5, including controls for parent and student 
characteristics as well as standardized test grade and discipline. Panel A reports coefficients for 
the Involvement at Home index and Panel B reports coefficients for the Formal Involvement 
index. Additional controls are added gradually, with eight municipality dummies included in 
columns (2) and (3), controls for school characteristics included in column (3), school fixed 
effects included in column (4) and class fixed effects included in column (5). 
Table 2: OLS estimates for Parental Involvement  
 Test scores (MAT and PT; grades 3, 4 and 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A      
Parental Involvement at Home  0.362*** 0.327*** 0.265*** 0.130 0.113 
 (0.108) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099) (0.120) 
School FE No No No Yes No 
Class FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.086 0.115 0.150 0.278 0.510 
R-squared adj. 0.082 0.109 0.142 0.244 0.376 
Observations 3056 3056 2986 3056 3056 
Panel B      
Formal Parental Involvement  -0.200** -0.182** -0.126 -0.114 -0.136 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.086) (0.080) (0.113) 
School FE No No No Yes No 
Class FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.080 0.110 0.147 0.279 0.510 
R-squared adj. 0.076 0.104 0.139 0.245 0.376 
Observations 3064 3064 2994 3064 3064 
Note: OLS estimates as specified in Section 5. Robust standard errors clustered at the school-level in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Panel A reports coefficients for the index of Parental 
Involvement at Home (frequency of helping with homework; having family meals; keeping clear rules; keeping a regular 
sleep schedule for the student). Panel B reports coefficients for the index of Formal Parental Involvement (being a member 
of the Parents Committee; frequency of attending general school meetings; having placed a suggestion or complaint 
regarding municipality education services). All regressions include Parent controls, Student controls, grade and test 
discipline controls. In columns (2) and (3) Municipality dummies are included. In column (3) School controls are included. 
Column (4) includes School fixed effects. Column (5) includes Class fixed effects. Parent controls consist of whether the 
respondent is the student’s parent; his age; gender; whether he has a partner; number of dependent children; and whether 
he has completed primary school. Student controls consist of age and gender. School controls include the total number of 
students; total number of teachers; number of classrooms and dummies if the school has at least one bathroom; if it has 
electricity; and if it has access to water (respectively).   
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Estimates on Panel A suggest that, as expected, higher involvement at home is positively 
and significantly correlated with higher standardized test scores across both disciplines and all 
grades.13 In our simplest specification, the coefficient of interest is 0.36 and statistically 
different from zero at a 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in our involvement at home 
index is associated with a 0.36-point increase, on a scale of 1-10, in standardized test results. 
Once municipality dummies and school controls are included, the magnitude of the coefficient 
does not change by much and its significance is unaltered. However, once we include school or 
class fixed effects (columns 4 and 5), the magnitude of the coefficient drops by more than half, 
and it is no longer significant. Hence, the significant correlations in columns (1)-(3) are driven 
by variability between rather than within schools. Whilst the parents of 40 randomly selected 
students were invited for interviews, on average only 16 parents were interviewed per school. 
Our parent sample is likely too small and fairly homogeneous within schools, so there might 
not be enough variation to detect significant correlations between involvement at home and test 
scores at this level. 
When it comes to formal involvement, estimates on Panel B suggest that, contrary to our 
expectations, higher formal participation is associated with lower test results across all grades 
and disciplines.14,15 In our simplest specification, the coefficient of interest is -0.2 and 
statistically different from zero at a 5% significance level. A one standard deviation increase in 
our formal involvement index is associated with a 0.2-point decrease, on a scale of 1-10, in 
standardized test scores. However, once we control for school characteristics (column 3), the 
coefficient is no longer significant. When we include school or class fixed effects (columns 4 
 
13 We conduct separate analysis for Portuguese and Maths, finding that although the magnitude of coefficients is 
slightly larger for Portuguese tests, effects are not statistically different across disciplines. 
14 Separate analysis for both disciplines shows that coefficients are only significant for Maths. For Portuguese 
tests, coefficients are still negative, albeit slightly smaller and thus not significant. 
15 We run regressions before aggregating indicators into indices, finding that all three survey measures of formal 
participation are negatively correlated with test scores. One might wonder if the negative direction of the 
correlation could be entirely due to the suggestions/complaints dummy, however, disaggregated results show 
similar coefficients for members of Parent Committees and for parents who have placed a suggestion/complaint. 
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and 5), coefficients are similar in magnitude to those in the specification with school controls, 
and still not significant. As in Panel A, significant correlations are driven by variability between 
rather than within schools. Nevertheless, unlike in the case of involvement at home, we suspect 
that there is some variation in formal participation within schools (i.e., some parents are 
members of Parent Committees), but that certain school characteristics make this type of 
involvement ineffective. Finally, comparing both involvement types, the magnitudes and 
significance of coefficients are larger for involvement at home than for formal participation.  
The negative correlations observed in Panel B are surprising and worth discussing, so we 
illustrate possible mechanisms of how higher parental participation via formal channels can 
translate into lower test performance. Firstly, our coefficients could be capturing negative self-
selection on unobservables. There might be students who, despite struggling with learning, 
continue to attend classes and took standardized tests because their parents are highly engaged 
at school. In addition, parents of students with low academic ability might be more motivated 
to be formally involved.16 If this is the case, our estimates would be biased downwards. This 
explanation resonates with Miguel and Kremer’s (2004) finding that a deworming intervention 
in Kenya increased school participation, but did not improve test scores, as “low-ability” 
students might have disproportionately self-selected into the programme. To mitigate selection 
bias in our estimations, it would be useful to control for student’s past test performance. 
However, this is not possible due to dataset limitations. 
A second hypothesis is that if the two involvement types are substitutes, and parents 
optimally adjust individual educational inputs, then they might see formal participation as a 
sufficient contribution to their children’s education, decreasing support at home. Since we find 
positive and significant correlations on Panel A, if parents substitute away from involvement at 
 
16 We are not stating that our regressions suffer from simultaneity. Our involvement measures mostly refer to 
participation in the past school year, so standardized tests took place after involvement decisions were made. 
Instead, negative self-selection would be tied to omitted variable bias (i.e. student ability).  
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home, that could explain the negative correlations on Panel B.  Although not exactly similar, 
some literature provides evidence for parents adjusting individual efforts in response to higher 
school inputs. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) find that when children are admitted to higher-
quality secondary schools in Romania, parents adjust efforts at home, spending less time 
helping with homework. Das et al. (2013) find that when school grants are anticipated by 
households in rural India, parents reduce educational spending, offsetting the positive impact 
of grants on tests. However, we consider it unlikely that parents in our sample are substituting 
away from involvement at home, as conditional correlations between the two involvement types 
are positive and significant, albeit quite small (see Table A1, in the annex).  
On the other hand, given that the significant correlations for formal participation come from 
variability between schools, hypotheses related to how parent’s participation affects 
performance at the school level might also be of use. Following results in Blimpo, Evans, and 
Lahire (2015), one such hypothesis is that if parental human capital is sufficiently low, 
increased participation in Parent Committees or general school meetings can unintendedly lead 
to poorer school decision-making, which can be conducive to decreased learning outcomes. We 
conduct a heterogeneous analysis by parent’s education level in section 6.2.  
Finally, some schools might have particular characteristics that make formal parental 
participation counterproductive to learning. In lower-quality, poorly managed schools, parents 
might find it difficult to effectively hold teachers and directors accountable, and contribute to 
better school governance, even if they intend to. Parents might also have a hard time deciding 
on priorities in schools with a wide array of problems, and unintendedly contribute to the 
dispersion of attention and resources across several issues, or focus on matters less beneficial 
to learning, as in Beasley and Huillery (2017). We conduct a heterogeneous analysis 
considering school performance in section 6.3. Note that selection biases previously discussed 
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would also apply at the school level, and could be stronger for lower-quality schools, thus 
explaining any heterogeneity we might find. 
6.2. Heterogeneous estimates by Parental Education 
As previously mentioned, a strand of the literature highlights how parents’ education and 
capacities can shape the direction and magnitude of the effect of parental involvement on 
learning outcomes, particularly when it comes to formal types of participation (Blimpo, Evans, 
and Lahire, 2015; Beasley and Huillery, 2017). Blimpo, Evans, and Lahire find that grants and 
training to School Committees in the Gambia positively impacted test results in villages with 
adult literacy rates greater than 45%, but negatively impacted tests in villages with sufficiently 
lower literacy rates. It is feasible that less-educated parents in our sample are less able to take 
advantage of Parent Committees, or general school meetings, to raise awareness on pressing 
educational concerns, voice their preferences, and influence school decision-making in a way 
that is conducive to improved learning. Thus, we test the hypothesis that uneducated parents 
might amplify the negative correlation for formal participation found in section 6.1.   
Similarly, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2012) find that Pakistani mothers with some formal 
education dedicate significantly more time to assist their children with schoolwork, generating 
positive spillovers on children’s test performance. It is feasible that less-educated parents in our 
sample are less equipped to support their children at home, keeping clear rules and healthy 
habits, or helping them with homework. Hence, having uneducated parents might reduce the 
positive correlation for participation at home found in section 6.1.   
Heterogeneous estimates by parental education are presented in Table 3. Presentation and 
specifications are the same as in Table 2, with the addition that to detect heterogeneity, we 
include an interaction term between each involvement index and a dummy for parents who did 
not complete primary schooling. The interaction coefficient measures how the correlation 
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between involvement and test scores is amplified or reduced for uneducated parents. We also 
include the p-value for the F-statistic of the total conditional correlation between parental 
involvement and test scores, that is, the sum of the parental involvement coefficient with the 
interaction coefficient. 
  
Panel A does not provide evidence that the correlation between involvement at home and 
test results is significantly reduced for uneducated parents, as interaction coefficients are never 
Table 3: Heterogeneous estimates by Parental Education  
 Test scores (MAT and PT; grades 3, 4 and 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A      
Parental Involvement at Home 0.473*** 0.365*** 0.308** 0.134 0.175 
 (0.145) (0.134) (0.134) (0.139) (0.169) 
Uneducated parent -0.805*** -0.706*** -0.369** -0.003 -0.050 
 (0.156) (0.149) (0.151) (0.132) (0.166) 
Inv. at Home x Uneducated parent -0.243 -0.083 -0.094 -0.008 -0.114 
 (0.200) (0.187) (0.197) (0.191) (0.224) 
School FE No No No Yes No 
Class FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.086 0.115 0.150 0.278 0.510 
R-squared adj. 0.082 0.109 0.142 0.243 0.376 
Observations 3056 3056 2986 3056 3056 
Inv. Home + Inv. Home x Uneduc = 0  
(F-stat p-value) 0.115 0.047 0.149 0.354 0.701 
Panel B      
Formal Parental Involvement  -0.228* -0.204* -0.125 -0.145 -0.198 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.111) (0.111) (0.151) 
Uneducated parent -0.888*** -0.783*** -0.419*** -0.025 -0.063 
 (0.160) (0.151) (0.153) (0.134) (0.169) 
Formal Inv. x Uneducated parent 0.077 0.061 -0.004 0.085 0.159 
 (0.176) (0.172) (0.167) (0.172) (0.204) 
School FE No No No Yes No 
Class FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.080 0.110 0.147 0.279 0.510 
R-squared adj. 0.076 0.104 0.139 0.245 0.376 
Observations 3064 3064 2994 3064 3064 
Formal Inv. + Formal Inv. x Uneduc = 0  
(F-stat p-value) 0.261 0.281 0.318 0.623 0.793 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the school-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. Uneducated parent is a dummy variable equal to 1 for respondents who have not completed primary 
schooling. All regressions include Parent controls, Student controls, grade and test discipline controls. In columns (2) and 
(3) Municipality dummies are included. In column (3) School controls are included. Column (4) includes School fixed 




significant, albeit negative. For educated parents, coefficients are higher than those found in 
benchmark specifications (Table 1, Panel A). The F-statistic for the total conditional correlation 
between uneducated parents’ involvement at home and test scores is still significant in 
specification (2). Thus, we find no consistent evidence for heterogeneity in terms of parental 
education, and there can still be learning gains when uneducated parents increase at-home 
support.   
Likewise, when it comes to formal participation, Panel B provides no evidence that the 
correlation between formal involvement and test results is significantly lower for uneducated 
parents. Interaction coefficients are close to zero and never significant, albeit surprisingly 
positive. For educated parents, formal involvement coefficients are negative and significant in 
specifications (1) and (2), and very similar in magnitude to those in benchmark estimations 
(Table 1, Panel B). Hence, we find no evidence that the negative correlation between formal 
participation and test performance is coming from counterproductive participation of 
uneducated parents.  
6.3.  Heterogeneous estimates by School Performance 
Some literature, particularly evaluations of school autonomy policies, show that the quality 
and capacity of local institutions can shape the effect of formal parental involvement on learning 
outcomes (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky, 2008; Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann, 2013; 
Glewwe, Galiani, and Perez-Truglia, 2015). School quality is likely a particularly significant 
mediator. In lower-quality schools, riddled with a plethora of issues, parents might be more 
constrained to effectively contribute to school governance and oversight. They might also find 
it more difficult to decide and act on priorities, given many pressing problems, and focus on 
matters less beneficial to learning (Beasley and Huillery, 2017), or unintendedly contribute to 
the dispersion of attention and resources across several issues.  
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We take the school’s relative performance in standardized tests as a proxy for overall quality 
and test the hypothesis that the negative correlation for formal participation found in section 
6.1 is mitigated when children attend top-performing schools.17 
When it comes to involvement at home, it is also feasible that the efficacy of parental efforts 
might be amplified when students attend better schools and mitigated when they attend lower-
quality schools. Thus, we test the hypothesis that the positive correlation between support at 
home and test scores found in section 6.1 is amplified when children attend top-performing 
schools.  
Heterogeneous estimates by school performance are presented in Table 4. Specifications 
and general presentation are the same as in previous tables. We measure school performance 
by computing the school’s average z-score for standardized test results in Maths and 
Portuguese, across all grades.18 All schools were then ranked according to their mean score. To 
detect heterogeneity, we include an interaction term between parental involvement and a 
dummy for schools in the top tercile of the school performance ranking. The interaction 
coefficient measures how the correlation between involvement and test scores is amplified or 
reduced when children attend top schools. We also include the p-value for the F-statistic of the 
total conditional correlation between participation and test scores, that is, the sum of the 
coefficient for parental involvement with the interaction coefficient.   
Panel A does not provide evidence that students who attend schools on the top tercile of our 
ranking benefit relatively more from parental support at home than students who attend lower-
performing schools, as interaction coefficients are never significant. As evidenced by the F-
 
17 Recall that in benchmark estimations, we do not find a significant correlation between formal participation and 
test scores once we control for school characteristics. This section is also pertinent to understand this result.  
18 To clarify: since we have six test types, we compute six z-scores per school. That is, in the first school we take 
3rd grade Maths results, demean the variable and divide it by the sample standard deviation in 3rd grade Maths, 
then move on to 3rd grade Portuguese, so on and so forth. We then compute the school score by taking an equally-
weighted average of z-scores across the six test types. 
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statistics p-values, the total correlation between involvement at home and test results for 
students who attend top-performing schools is positive and significant in specifications (1) and 
(2), and the magnitude of this correlation is similar to benchmark estimates (Table 1, Panel A). 
Overall, it appears that the significant correlations in Table 1, Panel A, are split once we 
distinguish schools in terms of performance.  
 
On the other hand, Panel B provides evidence that the correlation between formal 
participation and test results is strongly mediated by school quality. When students attend 
Table 4: Heterogeneous estimates by School Performance 
 Test scores (MAT and PT; grades 3, 4 and 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A     
Parental Involvement at Home 0.172 0.166 0.172 0.071 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.112) (0.112) 
Top performing school 1.769*** 1.662*** 1.492*** 2.509*** 
 (0.154) (0.162) (0.163) (0.076) 
Inv. at Home x top performing school 0.155 0.148 0.099 0.166 
 (0.199) (0.201) (0.210) (0.227) 
School FE No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.174 0.184 0.195 0.278 
R-squared adj. 0.170 0.178 0.188 0.244 
Observations 3056 3056 2986 3056 
Inv. Home + Inv. Home x Top school = 0  
(F-stat p-value) 0.048 0.065 0.133 0.229 
Panel B     
Formal Parental Involvement  -0.285*** -0.274*** -0.258*** -0.234*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.087) 
Top performing school 1.819*** 1.713*** 1.534*** 2.606*** 
 (0.156) (0.164) (0.162) (0.065) 
Formal Inv. x top performing school 0.398** 0.379** 0.392** 0.368** 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.169) (0.172) 
School FE No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.173 0.184 0.196 0.280 
R-squared adj. 0.170 0.178 0.188 0.246 
Observations 3064 3064 2994 3064 
Formal Inv. + Formal Inv. x Top school = 0 
(F-stat p-value) 0.449 0.489 0.352 0.382 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the school-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. School performance is measured by the average z-score of standardized test results in Maths 
and Portuguese across all grades. All schools were then ranked according to their mean z-score. Top performing school 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the school is in the highest tercile of the test results ranking. All regressions include Parent 
controls, Student controls, grade and test discipline controls. In columns (2) and (3) Municipality dummies are 
included. In column (3) School controls are included. Column (4) includes School fixed effects. Refer to notes of 
Table 2 for the definition of controls and main regressors used.  
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schools in the middle-or-lower tercile of our school ranking, parental participation is negatively 
and significantly correlated with test scores. Moreover, these coefficients are larger in 
magnitude and significance than benchmark estimates in Table 1, Panel B. However, the 
interaction term for formal participation in top-performing schools is positively and 
significantly correlated with test scores. Thus, when students attend a top-performing school, 
the total correlation between formal participation and test results is positive, albeit not 
significant, as evidenced by the F-statistic p-values. Hence, it is only in the lower-performing 
schools of our sample that formal parental involvement can be detrimental to learning. 
6.4. Other measures of Parental Involvement 
Table A2, in the annex, presents estimates for other measures of parental involvement, 
namely, Parent-Teacher Engagement and Parent-Community Engagement. In the former, we 
consider the frequency of interactions between parents and teachers, via the supply of 
information on the child’s performance at school, and through parent-teacher meetings. In the 
latter, we consider the frequency of parents chatting amongst each other about school and their 
children, and whether respondents consider that parents in the community understand the 
benefits of education. Table A2 presents evidence for positive and significant coefficients for 
both measures, but these are lower in magnitude and significance when compared to the 
correlations for involvement at home (Table 1, Panel A). Moreover, we consider that these are 
likely noisier measures of individual participation than our main indices, as they also reflect 
teachers’ and other parents’ attitudes and actions. 
7. Further discussion 
Whilst our specifications employ a wide range of controls and fixed effects at various levels, 
we would like to improve our identification strategy. Parental involvement is endogenously 
determined and there could be omitted variables, such as parent and student ability, or how each 
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parent values education, that explain both the decision to engage with their child’s education 
and student’s test performance. To address these concerns, we attempt an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) approach. We take advantage of the randomization of treatments designed to mobilize 
parents in the field experiment to instrument for the involvement decision. Di Maro et al. (2020) 
find that in treated schools parents increased involvement at home, contacts with teachers, and 
formal participation, but find no indirect impact on test results. Thus, we hypothesize that 
exposure to treatments can explain variations in our involvement indices, which are similar to 
those in Di Maro et al., and that it is plausible that treatments can only impact test scores via 
increased parental involvement.  
Exposure to the information campaign is individually significant to instrument for 
involvement at home and engagement with teachers, one of our secondary measures. Exposure 
to other treatments employed in the RCT is not individually significant to explain any of our 
involvement indices. Unfortunately, as reported on Table A3, in the annex, when we instrument 
for involvement using the information treatment, first-stage F-statistics are too small to 
overcome critical values of the weak-instrument test, as per Stock and Yogo (2005). As weak 
instruments increase noise in the estimations, we cannot trust second-stage estimates. 
Other tested instruments include the distance of parent’s birthplace neighbourhood relative 
to the school, the distance of the household relative to the school,19 how long the household has 
lived in the same neighbourhood and how long the household has lived in the school 
neighbourhood (for those that do). Our rationale was that fairly exogenous geographical 
variability could contain information on familiarity with local institutions, and thus explain 
variations in formal participation. However, the performance of these IVs was inferior to that 
of the information treatment.   
 
19 We find that the distance of the household relative to the school is not correlated with student absenteeism, so 
we considered that using it as an IV would not violate the exclusion restriction.  
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8. Concluding Remarks 
This paper takes advantage of an extensive micro-level dataset for a sample of parents and 
primary-school students in the province of Kwanza-Sul, Angola, and uses a non-experimental 
approach to examine conditional correlations between two types of parental participation and 
children’s learning, as measured by standardized test performance.  
We find that, on average, involvement at home is positively and significantly correlated 
with test scores, whereas formal involvement at school is negatively and significantly correlated 
with test results, although the magnitude and significance of the first relationship is higher. We 
do not report consistent evidence for heterogeneity with regards to parent’s education.  
However, we find that the relationship between formal participation and test results is strongly 
shaped by school quality, as the average negative correlation found in benchmark specifications 
is exclusive to parental participation in lower-performing schools. We hypothesize that parents 
might find it difficult to identify priorities, or unintendedly contribute to the dispersion of 
attention and resources, in schools with many pressing necessities. In addition, parents might 
be more constrained to effectively hold teachers and directors accountable in lower-performing 
schools. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that negative estimates for formal 
participation are explained by self-selection, as parents of students with poor academic track 
records, or low ability, might be more motivated to be formally involved. Selection bias would 
also apply at the school level, and might be stronger in lower-quality schools, hence possibly 
explaining our heterogeneous findings as well.  
We acknowledge that our analysis has several shortcomings. First, our identification 
strategy is not as robust as we hoped for, since attempts at an IV approach were mostly 
unsuccessful, hence we make no definitive causal assertions. Second, our dataset does not allow 
us to match parents and students at baseline and endline, so we can only conduct a static 
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analysis. Third, the use of self-reported measures of parental involvement comes with obvious 
limitations, although careful analysis of our data does not lead us to think parents are generally 
overstating their participation. Finally, we discuss possible mechanisms that explain negative 
correlations for formal participation but were unable to further elaborate.  
This being said, one implication from our analysis is particularly uplifting, as we provide 
evidence that, regardless of how little, whatever parents can do to support education at home 
matters, as there are potential learning gains even when parents themselves are uneducated. 
This is particularly relevant to contexts where parents might lack the capacity to support their 
children’s education, as is the case in Kwanza-Sul, where the adult literacy rate is 55%, 
decreasing to 43.4% in rural areas, or Angola more generally. Thus, programmes that build 
parents’ capacities on this topic, giving them clear and direct instructions, such as setting 
schedules for playtime, schoolwork and sleep, how to monitor homework completion, and 
understanding symbols used by teachers to grade schoolwork, can be conducive to improved 
learning.  
A second implication is a warning against one-size-fits-all participatory programmes, as 
formal parental involvement can be counterproductive in deprived areas, with lower quality 
schools, where students are already behind. It is important to ensure that participation comes 
with real authority, and that programmes train parents to effectively monitor school 
performance, particularly in schools where this is most difficult. Whilst lately, development 
practitioners and policy-makers have focused on formally including parents in schools, we 
would argue that it is important not to forget what parents, despite several constraints, can do 
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Table A1: Correlations between Formal Involvement and Involvement at Home 
 Parental Involvement at Home 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
Formal Parental Involvement  0.090*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
R-squared 0.048 0.057 0.062 
R-squared adj. 0.044 0.051 0.056 
Observations 3056 3056 2986 
 Formal Parental Involvement 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) 
Parental Involvement at Home 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
R-squared 0.040 0.052 0.046 
R-squared adj. 0.036 0.046 0.041 
Observations 3056 3056 2986 
Note: Conditional correlations between Formal Involvement and Involvement at Home. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  Panel B inverts the order of the correlation in Panel A. The index of 
Parental Involvement at Home includes the frequency of helping the student with homework, having family meals, 
keeping clear rules, and a regular sleep schedule for the student. The index of Formal Parental Involvement includes 
whether the respondent is a member of the Parents Committee, the frequency of attending general school meetings, 
and having placed a suggestion or complaint regarding municipality education services. All regressions include 
Parent and Student controls. In columns (2) and (3) Municipality dummies are included. In column (3) School 
controls are included. Parent controls consist of whether the respondent is the student’s parent; his age; gender; 
whether he has a partner; number of dependent children; and whether he has completed primary school. Student 
controls consist of age, gender and school grade. School controls include the total number of students; total number 
of teachers; number of classrooms and dummies if the school has at least one bathroom; if it has electricity; and if 






Table A2: Other measures of Parental Involvement  
 Test scores (MAT and PT; grades 3, 4 and 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A      
Parent-Teacher Engagement  0.140* 0.150* 0.140* 0.020 -0.094 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.076) (0.071) (0.092) 
School FE No No No Yes No 
Class FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.082 0.113 0.148 0.278 0.510 
R-squared adj. 0.079 0.107 0.141 0.244 0.375 
Observations 3030 3030 2962 3030 3030 
Panel B      
Parent-Community Engagement 0.168** 0.176** 0.128 0.138* 0.195* 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.080) (0.078) (0.111) 
School FE No No No Yes No 
Class FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.081 0.111 0.147 0.278 0.510 
R-squared adj. 0.077 0.105 0.140 0.244 0.376 
Observations 3051 3051 2981 3051 3051 
Note: OLS estimates for measures of parental involvement not employed in the main analysis. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the school-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Panel A 
reports coefficients for the index of Parent-Techer Engagement (frequency of receiving information on the child’s 
performance; autonomously going to school to talk to the teacher; being invited by the teacher to come to school). Panel 
B reports coefficients for the index of Parent-Community Engagement (frequency of talking to other parents about 
school; whether the respondent considers that parents in the community understand the benefits of education). All 
regressions include Parent controls, Student controls, grade and test discipline controls. In columns (2) and (3) 
Municipality dummies are included. In column (3) School controls are included. Column (4) includes School fixed 
effects. Column (5) includes Class fixed effects. Parent controls consist of whether the respondent is the student’s parent; 
his age; gender; whether he has a partner; number of dependent children; and whether he has completed primary school. 
Student controls consist of age and gender. School controls include the total number of students; total number of 
teachers; number of classrooms and dummies if the school has at least one bathroom; if it has electricity; and if it has 





Table A3: Second-stage IV estimates (Instrument = Information Treatment in RCT) 
 Test scores (MAT and PT; grades 3, 4 and 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A       
Parental Involvement at Home  0.617 0.864 0.767 0.303 0.801 0.946 
 (2.102) (1.816) (2.287) (1.803) (1.575) (1.960) 
Municipality dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
School controls No No Yes No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 6.419 7.360 3.640 8.415 10.666 6.167 
Centered R-squared 0.004 -0.011 -0.012 0.004 -0.016 -0.032 
Observations 3056 3056 2915 2880 2880 2744 
Panel B        
Parent-Teacher Engagement 0.832 1.441 0.938 0.481 1.230 1.044 
 (1.905) (2.248) (2.019) (1.660) (1.910) (1.797) 
Municipality dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
School controls No No Yes No No Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 5.604 4.042 3.957 7.179 5.573 5.701 
Centered R-squared -0.036 -0.130 -0.047 -0.009 -0.091 -0.058 
Observations 3030 3030 2891 2857 2857 2723 
Note: Second-stage IV estimates. We instrument for parental involvement using exposure to an information campaign employed 
in the field experiment. Robust standard errors clustered at the school-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Panel A reports coefficients for the index of Parental Involvement at Home (frequency of helping 
with homework; having family meals; keeping clear rules; keeping a regular sleep schedule for the student). Panel B reports 
coefficients for the index of Parent-Teacher Engagement (frequency of receiving information on the child’s performance; 
autonomously going to school to talk to the teacher; being invited by the teacher to come to school). All regressions include 
Parent controls, Student controls, grade and test discipline controls. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) Municipality dummies are 
included. In columns (3) and (6) School controls are included. Specifications (1) to (3) employ the same Parent and Student 
controls as OLS specifications; see notes of Table 2 for a full listing. Specifications (4) to (6) include additional Parent controls, 
namely: whether the respondent works in agriculture or fishing; is a housewife; is unemployed; is retired; whether he/she lives 
in the school neighbourhood; for how long he/she has lived in the current neighbourhood. Specifications (4) to (6) also include 









Table A4: Parental Involvement Indices - Variables Description 
  Survey Question Scale 
Panel A: Principal measures  
Parental Involvement at Home   
In the past two weeks, how many days have you or any adult in the household 
helped your child with homework? 
0 – 14 (days) 
In the past two weeks, how many days did all the members of the household sit 
down and had a meal together? 
0 – 14 (days) 
How frequently does the following situation occur? “I keep clear rules in my house 
that my child must obey.” 
0 (never) – 4 (very frequent) 
How frequently does the following situation occur? “I keep a regular wake up and 
sleep schedule for my child.” 
0 (never) – 4 (very frequent) 
Formal Parental Involvement   
Currently, are you a member of the Parents Committee? 0 (No) – 1 (Yes) 
In the past school year, how often did you go to your child’s school to attend 
general school meetings? 
0 (never) – 7 (every week) 
In the past two years, have you ever placed a criticism, suggestion or complaint 
related to the educational services of the municipality? 
0 (No) – 1 (Yes) 
Panel B: Additional measures  
Parent-Teacher Engagement  
In the past school year, how often did the following situation occur? “You received 
some information about your child’s performance at school.” 
0 (never) – 7 (every week) 
In the past school year, how often did the following situation occur? “You were 
invited for a meeting with your child’s teacher.” 
0 (never) – 7 (every week) 
In the past school year, how often did the following situation occur? “You went to 
school to talk to your child’s teacher by your own initiative.” 
0 (never) – 7 (every week) 
Parent-Community Engagement  
How frequently does the following situation occur? “I talk to other parents about 
subjects related to school or our children.” 
0 (never) – 4 (very frequent) 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Parents in my community 
have not yet understood the benefits education brings to the lives of their children.” 
1 (strongly agree) – 5 (strongly 
disagree) 
